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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIMnINAL CASES
AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND
PRACTICE IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
Because of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the right
of an accused to counsel in criminal cases is in doubt.' A cur-
rent commentator, in writing about the application of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases in-
volving benefit of counsel by the Court, says: 2
The weight of the Court's opinions leads to the conclusion
that there is no absolute right to counsel nor any definite
criteria by which the Court determines whether denial of the
right resulted in a deprivation of liberty without due process.
The Supreme Court maintains that the 'Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not to be interpreted as a protection for the rights of
an individual who stands trial in the state courts. It guar-
antees almost no procedural rights, in criminal cases, to those
accused in the state courts? Since 1942, "the constitutional
status of the right to legal counsel" has become "increasingly
precarious." ' At present, because of recent decisions, the
situation is so uncertain, that it is almost impossible for the
accused to be positive that he is guaranteed a given proced-
ural right.5
1 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (See annotation to this case, Accused's Con-
stitutional Right to Assistance of Counsel, 84 L. Ed. 383.) Green, Liberty Under the
Fourteenth Amendment: 1942-1943, 28 WAsH. U.L.Q. 251 (1943); Green, Liberty
Under the Fourteenth Amendment: 1943-1944, 29 WAsH. U.L.Q. 437 (1944); Wilk-
kerson, The Federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 GEo. L.J.
439, 460 (1938). See also Note, 13 B.U.L. Rav. 92 (1933); 8 Wis. L. RFv. 370
(1933).
2 WOOD, DUE PRocEsS OF LAW 217 (1951).
3 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173
(1946); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915).
4 WOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218.
5 Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941) (The accused was erroneously
sentenced twice for one offense for which he had been found guilty. This, the Court
decided did not constitute double jeopardy.) Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal Pro-
tection of Negro Rights, 46 COL. L. REv. 94 (1946).
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In the case of Betts v. Brady,' the right of the accused to
counsel in a criminal trial in a state court, was declared a
matter to be decided by the states themselves. Betts, who had
been indicted in a Maryland district court on a charge of rob-
bery, asked the trial judge to appoint an attorney to assist
him in his defense. He claimed that he was indigent. The
judge refused, stating that it was not the custom of the court
to appoint counsel for paupers who were charged with crimes
other than murder or rape. The accused was found guilty and
sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.
Betts sought release through a habeas corpus proceeding
on the grounds that the trial was unfair as he had been denied
counsel. The Court.pointed out that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not include those specific
rights which are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The
right to counsel in every criminal trial, based on the latter
Amendment, is binding only on the federal courts, but not on
the state courts.7 Due process, according to the Court, is: 8
• . . less rigid and more fluid than envisaged in other specific
and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application
is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given case.
The real issue which the Court was asked to decide was that
involving the due process clause. Does this clause require
that the state furnish counsel to the indigent in criminal
6 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
"7 Id. at 461-2. Contrast this decision with that of justice Holmes in Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-2 (1923) and Justice Murphy in Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 70, 76 (1942). See also Nutting, The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth
Amendment and State Criminal Cases, 3 U. OF Cmi. L. Rxv. 244 (1936).
8 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). The Court distinguished this case
from the case of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) on the basis of fact. Al-
though Powell v. Alabama declared that aid of counsel was fundamental to a hear-
ing as intended by the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority in this case held that
the rule did not apply. The intelligence of the defendant, his age and the existence
of state law made it essential that Powell have counsel; whereas, Betts was qualified
to defend himself. The Court believed that the age of the defendant in the present
case (43), his ordinary intelligence, and the fact that he had been in court on
previous occasions were adequate to qualify him to defend himself.
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cases, regardless of circumstances? ' Does the Sixth Amend-
ment express "a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair
trial.., that it is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment"? 10 The Court indicated that in
some instances the right to counsel was fundamental, and in
others it was not. It explained and justified the rule against
requiring the state to appoint counsel for the indigent in
serious criminal cases, by the statement that at English com-
mon law, one charged might not even employ counsel in cases
of felony and treason, let alone have counsel assigned to
him.11 Why, the Supreme Court asks, should one now be
assigned counsel in serious criminal cases as a part of due
process, when the right to have counsel of one's own choosing
was not permitted at common law, and statutes were neces-
sary to authorize their employment? 12 The Court points out,
after an investigation of colonial legislation and state statu-
tory and constitutional provisions, that in a majority of the
states "it has been the considered judgment of the people,
their representatives, and their courts that appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." "
The answer to the question, which the Court poses - Is
assistance of counsel, in a criminal case, a fundamental pro-
cedural right? - can only be rendered by the study of the
9 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942). In Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942), the defendant had been an Assistant United States Attorney for four
years. The Court held that this was immaterial to his right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.
10 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942).
11 Id. at 466. Y.B. 9 EDW. IV, pl. 4 (1469). "And note that the defendant in
indictment of felony shall not have counsel against the King if it is not a matter in
law; but in appeal it is otherwise." Here we see the decline of medieval criminal
procedure. See BRITTON 81 (Nichols' transl. 1901). Statute of Westminster the Sec-
ond, 1285, 13 EDw. I, c. 10; II HO LDSWORT, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 256-8
(4th ed. 1936).
12 The Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 WmLl. 3, c. 3 (The accused was permitted counsel
in "Cases of Treason and Misprison of Treason."); The Treason Act, 1746, 20 GEo.
1T, c. 30 (The right to counsel was extended to those impeached by Commons in
Cases of High Treason and Misprison of Treason.); The Trials for Felony Act,
1836, 6 & 7 WiLL. 4, c. 114 (All persons tried for felonies shall be admitted to make
their defense by counsel or attorney.).
13 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
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history of the rule itself. For past history is one of the chief
factors in determining present rights. Liberties and rights are,
in a sense, historical entities of a certain age. Perhaps one of
their most cogent rationalizations is that of the Middle Ages:
"It was ever thus by use and wont and the mind of the eldest
inhabitant runneth not to the contrary." 14
A cursory examination of the question of the right of the
accused to counsel in criminal cases demonstrates that the
Court's observations are some distance from the truth.
Christopher Saint Germain in 1523 recognized the right of
even the indigent to have counsel assigned in appeals of
felony. 5 Sir William Stanford, writing about thirty-four years
later, states that in indictments, one charged with treason or
felony may have counsel in questions of law but not in
questions of fact.' The party himself knows the fact better
than his counsel would, and his manner of pleading may aid
the court in determining the fact, while counsel would only
mislead, or delay the appearance of truth." When however,
the defendant's answer "exceeds his power to plead he shall
have counsel assigned to him notwithstanding that it is
against the King." "s He clearly states a rule to determine
prejudice to the defendant, that is, the question of law as
opposed to the question of fact. 9 Pulton, whose work was
14 As early as the laws of Edward the Elder (900-925), we have eviuicuce for
due process and a day in court. ATTENBOROUGr, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENG-
LisH KINGS 121 (1922). The Laws of Edgar, issued shortly before 962, state that:
"In the first place, my will is that every man, rich or poor obtain the benefit of the
public law and be awarded just decisions." ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF
ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY 125 (1925).
15 SAINT GEsvaiN, THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT 256-9 (Muchall's ed. 1874).
16 STANFORD, LES PLEES DE. CORONE (1607).
17 Holdsworth maintains that this concept was justified by the canon law prin-
ciple "that the prosecution must make his case so plain, that it was useless to look
at any evidence to the contrary." HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENG-
LISH LAW (1925). This topic will be given a more complete consideration at the
conclusion of this paper.
18 STANFORD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 151.
19 In practice this rule was less than adequate. "In the case of Joseph Hayes for
Treason, A.D. 1684, when the prisoner asked that counsel might be heard against
the admissibility of hands as evidence, adding he had been informed it bad been
denied to be evidence ... it was refused; Jeffreys saying, 'Somebody has put it into
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published in 1609, follows Stanford very closely." He recog-
nizes that if the plea exceeds the power, learning and knowl-
edge of the defendant to answer, he shall have counsel
assigned. This rule reverts back to the time of Britton
(1290), when counsel was permitted the accused in cases
involving exceptions to indictments.2 Sir Edward Coke,22 Sir
Matthew Hale" and William Hawkins" are all in substantial
agreement on this point.
The right of the accused to counsel in questions of law in
criminal cases was considered to be fundamental to a fair
trial by the English jurists in the seventeenth century.25
Thus, the Court's observations on the rule "that appointment
of counsel is not a fundamental right" at English common
law must be modified. Though the great English common law
lawyers acknowledged a legal tradition which prohibited the
accused assistance of counsel in questions of fact, they did
permit counsel in question of law. Blackstone commented on
the inhumanity of the rule "that no counsel shall be allowed
a prisoner on trial, upon the general issue in any capital
crime, unless some point of law shall arise to be debated,"
contending that it appeared to be inconsistent "with the rest
of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law." 26
your head, and puffed you up with a vain story: there is no such thing; it is a
fiction, a mere whim only . . . and no ground in the world for it.' And when the
prisoner afterwards objected that his Trial was not, as it ought to have been, under
the Stat. 35 H. 8, c. 2, and desired counsel to argue that point, Jeffreys refused it:
'We are of another opinion. If any whimsical notions are put into you by some
enthusiastic counsel, the court is not to take notice of their crochets.'" 5 STATE
TRIALS 475 (Howell ed. 1809-1826).
20 PuLTON, DE PACE REGIS ET REGo'r 192-3 (1609). This is essentially the opin-
ion expressed by Justice Reed in the case of Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
21 SELDEN SOCIETY, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 92-100 (Whittaker ed. 1895).
Though The Mirror of Justices is not a valid source, it contains a very interesting
and humanistic analysis of the right to counsel. See also BRITTON (Nichols' transl.
1901).
22 CoKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 29,
33-34,136-7, 230 (Brooke ed. 1797).
23 1I HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 236 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
24 11 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 554 (1824).
25 Becker and Heidelbaugh, Benefit of Counsel in Criminal Cases in the Time
of Coke, 6 MLuIra L. Q. 546 (1952).
26 4 BL. Com. *355.
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Not only did the first Vinerian Professor of English law
challenge the rule on humanitarian grounds, but he also
questioned its historical validity. He was not certain that it
was a part of medieval English law. A reading of the text of
Leges Henrici Primi supports Blackstone's contention." This
first English compilation of private law (neither Roman nor
Canon) made early in the twelfth century, does not prohibit
the accused assistance of counsel; rather it denies him the
right to a concilium - the obtaining of advice outside the
court from his circle of friends and kinsmen.2" Most modern
scholars, basing their conclusions on a mistranslation of con-
cilium, maintain that Leges Henrici Primi is the origin of the
rule denying benefit of counsel. Pollock and Maitland,"
Holdsworth, ° and Bigelow3 have erred on this point. The
rule is not a part of early common law. It evolved after
Britton, perhaps as a result of the gradual elimination of the
appeal of felony during the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies. 2 History does not support the United States Supreme
Court's conclusion that the appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial.33
The Court relates that statutes were necessary to secure
the employment of counsel in cases of felony and treason.
This is true. Why, however, were they passed by Parliament?
There is little evidence to support the hypothesis that
medieval English courts denied counsel until the fourteenth
century. The prohibition evolved in the subsequent period.
The judges themselves recognized the inhumanity of this
rule. They relaxed it in cases of felony and treason, before
27 1 LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER ANGELSACHEN 570 (Halle ed. 1903).
28 II id. 39; COHEN, A HISTORY OF THE BAR 1-19 (1929); BRUNNER, FORscHUN-
GEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN UND FRANzoSIscHEN RECHTS 423 (1894).
29 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed. 1905).
30 11 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 106.
31 BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 218 (1880). Accord, RIGHT-
MIRE, THE LAW OF ENGLAND AT THE NoRaaAN CONQUEST 35 (1932).
32 11 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 256. Fortescue in De Laudibus
Legut Angliae, written between 1460 and 1470, makes no mention of the right of
the accused in criminal cases, either to call witnesses or to have counsel.
33 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
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the passage of the statutes. Why did they suspend it in
criminal cases, in some instances? Because they recognized
that,' in certain instances, without counsel a fair trial is im-
possible.3 4 The Court holds that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be interpreted as an
"inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defend-
ant who is not represented by counsel." " Is this holding in
accord with legal experience? An examination of English trial
records does not substantiate the contention. The fact that
criminal trials could not be conducted fairly, without benefit
of counsel, was the reason for the passage of the three
statutes, which gave the accused the right to legal assistance.
A brief analysis of English State Trials leads to the conclu-
sion that without counsel criminal prosecutions were often
nothing more than legal murders.
The Duke of Norfolk was indicted for high treason in 1571.
He appealed to the court for aid of counsel, pointing out: 36
"I have had very short warning to provide to answer so great
a matter; I have not had fourteen hours in all, both day and
night, and now I neither hear the same statute alleged, and yet
I am put at once to the whole herd of laws, not knowing which
particularly to answer unto. The indictment containeth sundry
points and matters to touch me by circumstance, and so draw
me into the matter of treason which are not treasons them-
selves: therefore, with reverence and humble submission, I am
led to think I may have counsel. And this I show, that you
may think I move not this suit without any ground. I am
hardly handled. I have had short warning and no books."
Despite the fact that the Duke cited the case of Humphrey
Stafford, who had been indicted for "High Treason" in the
reign of Henry VII and had been permitted counsel, the court
refused to grant his request. Chief Justice Dier advised the
puke that, "Stafford had counsel only for an'incidental point
34 See I STmPEN, HISTORY OF THE CPmNiA LAW OF ENGLAND 424 (1883).
35 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
36 I STATE TREAs, op. cit. supra note 19, at 966.
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of law, concerning Sanctuary, and not upon the point of fact
of High Treason."
In 1653, that brave soldier in the cause of the Common-
wealth, Colonel Lilburne, charged with treason, pleaded that
Cromwell's Court grant him counsel; he maintained that he
was too ignorant of the law to conduct his own defense: "If
you will not assign me counsel to advise and consult with, I
am resolved to go no further, though I die for it, and my
innocent blood be upon your hands." " He was denied counsel,
despite his plea that as a "freeborn Englishman" he was en-
titled to a fair trial. The jury remembered, fortunately, the
services rendered by that brave soldier in the recent civil war,
and acquitted him.
Sir Henry Vane was not so fortunate in the Royal Court.
Indicted for high treason in 1662, he entreated the court to
assign him counsel, citing five important points of law on
which he needed legal advice. His petition, as in the earlier
trials of the regicides, was refused: he was found guilty. 8
Don Pantaleon, the brother of the Portuguese Ambassador,
was indicted for murder in 1654. In reply to his request for
counsel to conduct his defense the court said that, "No counsel
could be allowed to the Ambassador's brother in Matters of
Fact, but if in the proceedings of his Trial he should desire
counsel as to Matter of Law, it should be allowed him." On
the following day Don Pantaleon appeared in court and
pleaded ignorance of the laws of England and asked again
that the court assign him counsel. The court answered that
"they were of counsel equal to him as to the Commonwealth."
The verdict was a foregone conclusion. The trial record ends
in these words: "He... laid his head on the block, and it was
chopt off at two blows." 3
37' IV id. at 1329.
38 VI id. at 153.
39 Vid. at 479.
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The noble maxim, "the judge shall be counsel for the
prisoner," appears in practice to be found wanting. "The
judge shall see that the proceedings against the prisoner are
legal and strictly regular" 40 is yet another misleading phrase.
One unfortunate defendant, immediately after being told by
the judge that he would act as his counsel, heard him put a
question to the witness "directly tending to elicit proof of the
prisoner's guilt." The defendant could not restrain an outcry,
"Alas, my lord, if you were my counsel, you would not ask
that question." 41
The rule was so unfair that even Justice Jeffreys, the worst
of all English judges to sit in Westminster Hall, was moved
to condemn this abhorent practice as contrary to the princi-
ples of English justice in these words: 42
"I think it is a hard case that a man should have counsel to
defend himself for a twopenny trespass, and his witnesses
examined upon oath, but if he steal, commit murder or felony,
nay, high treason, where life, estate, honour, and all are con-
cerned, he shall neither have counsel nor his witnesses exam-
ined under oath."
Despite Jeffreys' moral protestations, he was not hindered
from conducting one of the most heinous criminal trials re-
corded in the annals of English legal history. A certain Mrs.
Lisle was convicted, in 1685, of treason for harboring a dis-
senting minister.43 Jeffreys had acted as counsel for the
prisoner, cluttering and browbeating witnesses out of their
senses. Mrs. Lisle said, as she mounted the scaffold: "
"I have been told the court ought to be counsel for the
prisoner; instead of which, there was evidence given from
40 4 BL. CoMM. *355.
41 V STAT TAms, op. cit. supra note 19, at 464.
42 V id. at 466.
43 XI id. at 297. She is referred to in the State Trials as "Lady Alice Lisle."
Since she was the widow of John Lisle, who had been one of Charles' judges, her
correct status is best described by the appelation "Mrs. Lisle."
44 XI id. at 322. During the trial Jeffreys had said: "For though we sit here as
judges over you by authority from the King, yet we are accountable, not only to
him, but to the King of kings, the great Judge of heaven and earth; and therefore
are obliged, both by our oaths, and upon our consciences, to do you justice, and by
the Grace of God we shall do it, you may depend upon it."
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thence, which though it was hearsay, might possibly effect my
jury. My defense was such as might be expected from a weak
woman; but such as it was, I did not hear it repeated again to
the jury. But I forgive all persons that have done me wrong,
and I desire that God will do so likewise."
The case of the Rajah Nuncomar is an example of one of
the most unfair trials, on a charge of felony, recorded in the
State Trials.45 He was indicted for the forgery of a bond at
Calcutta in 1775. The jury was composed of Englishmen liv-
ing in India. They spoke only English and the Rajah spoke
only his native tongue. Most of the witnesses for the crown
were also unable to communicate in a language in'telligible to
the accused. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct the trial
through sworn interpreters. The Rajah requested that his
counsel be permitted to address the court on his behalf. The
Chief Justice refused this reasonable plea, charging the jury
in these words: "
"By the laws of England, the counsel for prisoners charged
with felony are not allowed to observe on the evidence to the
jury, but are to confine themselves to matters of law.... But I
told them [the counsel] that if they would deliver to me any
observations they wished to be made to the jury, I would sub-
mit them to you and give them their full force, by which means
they will have the same advantage as they would have in a
civil case.'
The trial, conducted without full assistance of counsel, could
have terminated in only one way; the prisoner was found
guilty and hung.
The only justification for this inhumane rule, which pre-
cludes the right of the accused to a fair trial, was stated by
the Lord Chancellor Nottingham in the trial of Lord Corn-
wallis to be: "
"No other good reason can be given why the law refuses to
allow the prisoner at the bar counsel in matters of fact, where
life is concerned, excepting this, that the evidence by which he
45 XX id. at 923. See V MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HIsToRIcAL ESSAYS 151 et
seq. (1900).
46 XX STATE TRIALS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 923.
47 VII id. at 149.
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is condemned ought to be so very evident, and so plain, that
all the counsel in the world should not be able to answer it."
A cursory examination of the records of the State Trials
shows that frequently judgment was not rendered on the
basis of "evident facts" but rather on the basis of "hearsay."
In our age of relativism there are few "evident facts." These
"few facts" become even fewer when the scientific methods
of verification are applied to them. When Boroski, in 1662,
was put on trial for the murder of Mr. Thynne, he asked the
court for benefit of counsel. The Chief Justice denied his
request, reasoning that since " he was charged with matter of
fact: counsel could do him no good in such a case." 48
A reading of the text of Leges Henrici Primi 4.9 - Holds-
worth,50 Pollock and Maitland 5 and the other great legal
historians notwithstanding - will demonstrate that the
denial of benefit of counsel did not originate in English
medieval common law. Rather, it appears to have evolved
from two sources diametrically opposed to the spirit of the
Anglo-American legal system: canon law and royal absolutism.
In the reign of Mary, magistrates were given power to
examine prisoners secretly and through inquisitorial pro-
cedures, often under torture.52 These examinations were the
real trials in the significant state cases of that period. Prison-
ers were not premitted benefit of counsel; or were they
allowed to call witnesses on their behalf. The prohibitions
were justified on the canon law principle that "the prosecu.
tion must make his case so plain, that it was useless to look
at any evidence to the contrary." " These limits on the
liberties of the accused which were contrary to the principles
of common law were further buttressed by the concept of the
48 Vid. at 474.
49 LI-BERANN, op. cit. supra note 27.
50 HoaoswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 11.
51 PoLLocx AND M iTYmwD, op. cit. supra note 29.
52 Stat. 1554-1555, 1 & 2 PH. & MARY, c. 13; Stat. 1555-1556, 2 & 3 PH. &
MARY, C. 10.
53 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 171.
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crown's "extraordinary powers," which could in times of
emergency override the common law.
Fair trials, in capital cases, were almost impossible unless
the accused had benefit of counsel. This was the reason
statutes were passed granting the accused the right to coun-
sel in matters of fact in capital cases. -By the common law
rule, he had the right to counsel in matters of law. The intro-
duction of criminal procedure, justified by canon law princi-
ples and royal absolutism, weakened the rights of the accused
to counsel. In no case, however, did they destroy them com-
pletely, as suggested by the opinion in the Betts case.
An examination of the records of State Trials, over a period
of four centuries, denies the validity of the Supreme Court's
holding that a trial "can be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel." "'
Faulty history and the inability to profit from past experience
have led to the negation of the right to counsel.55
This development (so dangerous in the light of English
legal experience) of negating procedural rights is part of a
trend "apparent in due process cases involving other
rights." " As a letter published in a leading newspaper
pointed out: "
Betts v. Brady dangerously tilts the scales against the safe-
guarding of one of the.most precious rights of man. For in a
free world no man should be condemned to penal servitude for
years without having the right to counsel to defend him. The
right to counsel, for the poor as well as for the rich, is an
indispensable safeguard of freedom and justice under law.
Past history does have a bearing on present rights. Legal
tradition is the outcome of the past, not the fetter of the
54 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
55 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947);
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
56 WooD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 218. Miss Wood offers an excellent discussion
of the present threat to the constitutional status of procedural rights in criminal
cases in Chapter III.
57 N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1942, § 4, p. 6, col. 7.
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future. We should study the history of a legal tradition in
order to understand the conditions under which it arose, and
give it continuity, so that it may be used intelligently by
current lawmakers, legislative or judicial. As Holmes said: 5
• . . the rational study of law is still to a large extent the
study of history. History must be a part of the study, because
without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is
our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because
it is the first step towards an enlightened scepticisih, that is
toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
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